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1 
 
Relationships between popular culture and dominant systems of power 
can emerge more clearly in crisis than in routine times.  Powerful 
economic and political forces attempted to use 9/11 as a rationale to 
discipline popular culture.  Here I examine how this happened and how it 
spurred a form of at least provisional cultural resistance.  I look at two 
instances of attempted repression of popular culture that occurred post-
911 and at how the success of each was limited by popular cultural 
reactions against it. 
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The first involved an attempt to regulate popular cultural music, because 
of its perceived “inappropriateness” in the wake of the attacks.  The Clear 
Channel radio corporation decided to circulate a list of pop songs that 
corporate officials suggested not be played in the wake of the attacks, due 
to their potential to offend the “sensitivities” of radio listeners.  What the 
Clear Channel attempted was a distinctively postmodern form of 
censorship – postmodern in the sense that it was imposed, not by the 
authority of the modern state, but by large, multi-national, corporate 
interests in the name of “choice.”  The attempted suppression was 
ineffective on one level because of the unruliness of popular music as a 
site of cultural struggle.  On another level, however, it was effective in 
supporting a wider discourse of discipline that has been an important 
feature of post 9/11 politics.  That certain songs might be deemed 
inappropriate for playing in the wake of a cataclysmic tragedy is not 
surprising and perhaps, under some circumstances, not even dangerous.  
What was troubling about Clear’s response was the breadth of the impact, 
given the company’s substantial distributional assets, its often 
inexplicable selection of materials, and the list’s implicit support for 
ongoing attempts at political repression. 
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A second response to 9/11 was its framing as the “death of irony.”  Some 
suggested, indeed hoped, that 9/11 would rein in and discipline the 
“smirking” and superficial ironies endemic to many popular cultural 
productions – personified especially by the television program Seinfeld.  
“Irony” had previously been under siege by an eclectic array of liberal and 
conservative critics, the most prominent liberal being Jedediah Purdy.  
The WTC attack, some thought,  revealed the nihilistic implications of 
ironic discourses.  Yet hopes that popular cultural discourses would 
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become more “serious” in a world in which “everything had changed” 
were short-lived, as a new and darkly ironic discourse emerged with 9/11 
imagery as its subject.  In April, media reports surfaced of  teenagers 
using 9/11 “slang” as a mechanism of psychological normalizing.  Irony’s 
re-emergence was politically significant, evidence of both the strength 
and limitations of popular cultural resistance. 
 
4 
 
The events of 9/11 triggered the censor’s impulse:  to narrow, to control, 
to consolidate, to protect.  Popular culture’s ubiquity, the result partly of 
its transmission through large transnational media corporations, led to 
the channeling of this impulse in historically specific ways.  The Clear 
Channel’s strange and unaccountable list was one.  Pronouncements of 
“the death of irony” were another.  Forces that sought to discipline the 
popular culture, from corporate managers to magazine columnists, had 
seemingly found their moment; and they would use it to their advantage.  
Yet their attempted repressions were not entirely successful, nor could 
they be.  While accurately gauging the extent of their success is difficult, 
the reappearance of irony demonstrated that the disruptive impulses that 
are crucial to popular culture’s appeal, while perhaps wounded, were not 
entirely dead.  Ironic interventions into the meanings of 9/11 reasserted 
vitality in the face of death and resistance in the face of control.  
Censorship made irony’s reemergence possible, and perhaps inevitable. 
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The events of 9/11 thus revealed underlying tensions between popular 
culture and various cultural authorities that are and have been 
uncomfortable with its unruliness, seeing it as a sign of cultural 
degeneration.  The vitality of the popular culture was re-affirmed by post 
9/11 events, as producers and consumers reaffirmed its significance for 
sense making even – perhaps especially in – a politically  troubled and 
dangerous world.  Thus there are grounds for hope that progressive 
moments may yet emerge, but one needs to be careful:  the capacities of 
popular cultures to generate resistance are constrained, if not entirely 
controlled, by systems of power that were reinforced by the terrorist 
attack. 
 
 
 
 The List  
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A little more than a week after the attack on the World Trade Center, 
reports began to circulate that the Clear Channel had “barred,”1 
“banned,”2 or “yanked,”3 150 songs from its nationwide playlists.  The 
decision, if true, was significant, because of the size of market-share 
controlled by the Clear Channel.  The roster drew a good deal of 
attention.  Partly this was because, as The Houston Chronicle, noted 
“some free speech activists cried foul.”4  But it was due in part to the 
specific songs on it.  Songs seem to have been listed because they 
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“contain[ed] lyrics with words such as:  fire, plane, bullets, knives, 
bombs, destroy, suicide, and dust.”5  The executives at Clear worked with 
a broad brush. 
 
7 
 
The 150 titles on the proscribed list can be organized into four categories.  
First are those with titles that might have violent images or overtones, 
possibly making them inappropriate at an extraordinary moment in 
history.  In most cases, however, such an interpretation would be 
warranted only by an exceptionally literalistic take on the title alone.  As 
Los Angeles music critic Robert Hilburn put it, while the songs’ titles 
might seem violent, “the songs themselves aren’t.”  A good example is 
Peter and Gordon’s “I Go to Pieces.”6  If construed literally, it might refer 
to someone being physically destroyed.  Taken as a whole, however, it is a 
song about losing one’s lover.7  Others include AC/DC’s “Shot Down in 
Flames and Safe in New York City,” a song about being “shot down” when 
trying to pick up someone in a bar; the Gap Band’s “You Dropped a Bomb 
on Me,” about a young man being dropped by his girlfriend; and Bruce 
Springsteen’s “I’m on Fire,” about sexual desire.  Like many of its songs, 
“Burning Down a House” by the Talking Heads is elusive in meaning but 
certainly not violent.  “Great Balls of Fire” by Jerry Lee Lewis is about 
infatuation.  Of the songs evidently chosen because of the “violence” of 
their lyrics, only “Bodies” by the thrash-metal band Drowning Pools has 
lyrics that refer literally to death. 
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One interpretation of the decision to list such songs is that executives at 
Clear Channel were relatively sophisticated semioticians, aware that the 
power of texts can reside in their ambiguity, their connotative 
potentialities, their possible provocations.  Thus program directors 
needed to be extraordinarily careful not to unleash potentially damaging 
cultural material into the public space during a period of crisis.  While 
such an interpretation is possible, it seems unlikely, partly because no 
one attempted to defend the list along these lines.  Clear Channel 
executives more likely engaged in quick, simplistic, and highly literalistic 
reading of popular-cultural materials, reading entirely inconsistent with 
the ambiguities that make such materials popular.  Those who manage 
Clear Channel stations showed little if any understanding of the music 
over which they have a good deal of distributional control. 
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A second category targets more overtly political songs.  This category 
makes more sense semiotically, given that its songs make political 
statements that could be interpreted as leftist or pacifist, and thus could 
be construed as potentially subversive.  Here the progammers at the 
Clear Channel did seem to grasp, to some extent, the songs’ meanings.  
That makes the decision to ban such songs more  troubling, because it 
shows a conscious desire to suppress what was construed as political 
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dissent in the wake of the attacks.  Included are Barry McGuire’s classic 
’60s folk tune “Eve of Destruction” (banned for the second time in thirty-
six years) and “every song ever recorded” by Rage Against the Machine.  
Rage, a leftist band now disbanded, had a long and storied history of 
theatrical politics.  It even burned an American flag on Saturday Night 
Live.  Since Clear’s stated aim was to protect the “sensitivities” of its 
listeners, this second category of songs implies that any kind of political 
criticism, even when it has no connection to the attack, would be 
construed, at least temporarily, as “insensitive.” 
 
10 
 
A third category of  songs includes those that might have tortured topical 
ties to 9/11 but lack connection violence or politics.  The would-be ban 
included “Walk like an Egyptian” by the Bangles (because the hijackers 
were Middle Eastern?), “He Ain’t Heavy, He’s My Brother” by the Hollies 
(because someone’s brother may have died in the attack?), “What a 
Wonderful World” by Louis Armstrong (because it isn’t any longer?), 
“Ninety-Nine Red Balloons” by Nena (because Al Qaeda is our enemy in 
somewhat the same way that the “Reds” had been?), “Ob-La-Di, Ob-La-
Da” by the Beatles (because life doesn’t “go on”?), “America” by Neil 
Diamond (because the “they” of “they’re coming to America” could be 
hijackers?).  Your guess is as good as mine.  It is difficult to know what to 
say of the inclusion of such songs.  They make us wonder whether the 
notion of respecting popular “sensitivity,” put forward as a justification 
for the company’s actions, had any semiotic boundaries at all. 
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In the fourth category are songs that seem exceptionally appropriate to 
the circumstances but not the least objectionable.  These are songs of 
solace and reflection.  The attacks may have offered an occasion for a 
song as overplayed and sweetly sentimental as Paul Simon’s “Bridge Over 
Troubled Water” to sound fresh again.  John Lennon’s brilliant 
“Imagine,” also listed by Clear Channel, eventually became seen as a 
prescient, yet ambiguous, comment on the attack.  This came after Neil 
Young performed a haunting version on a nationally televised benefit for 
the families of those who had died.  Lennon’s lyrics had managed to 
capture and question the motives of the Al Qaeda terrorists but also those 
domestic politicians who would use the attack to stoke nationalist fervor 
and protect their own political power. 
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Cat Stevens might be given a category all his own.  Two of his songs, 
“Peace Train” and “Morning Has Broken,” were listed – apparently 
because he is now a practicing Muslim.8  
 
13 
 
These categories are simply a provisional attempt to make sense of what 
Clear Channel programmers might have been trying to do.  Their list 
came with no rationale, attempt to distinguish various materials, or  
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defense for including some songs over others.  As a result, it is likely to 
strike readers as irrational.  The apparent irrationality does not seem to 
have been intentional, a subterfuge designed to make it more difficult for 
readers and listeners to discern the intentions of executives at the Clear 
Channel.  Had there been an overt attempt to suppress only “political” 
songs, that would have been deplorable, but at least it might have made 
political sense.   The program directors at Clear might as well have taped 
all their playlists to the wall and thrown 150 darts to determine songs for 
the list.  As the President of Standard Broadcasting in Toronto 
understated, “It’s a pretty weird list.”9 
 
14 
 
As soon as the list became public, Clear Channel began to backpedal.  
Pam Taylor, a spokeswoman for the media conglomerate, stated that 
there was never a “directive” from the station’s corporate headquarters to 
pull or ban any songs.  Rather, she said, “This was an effort to help people 
to be sensitive to an unthinkable environment.  It’s been somewhat 
turned into some sort of evil attempt to control pop music, and that’s 
absurd.”10  Another spokeswoman, Rebecca Almon, said that “This is not 
a mandate, nor was the list generated out of the corporate radio offices.  
When we found out about the substance of this list, we let folks know that 
we don’t support it.”11  Executives at Clear Channel claimed that, in fact, 
the list had been generated spontaneously by local program directors, 
who were circulating it among themselves.  They were said to be making 
individual judgments about what might be appropriate, taking into 
account complaints that they might have received from listeners.  It was 
essentially a “grassroots” effort. 
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The New York Times, however, reported that anonymous sources at Clear 
had a somewhat more “complicated” story to tell.  According to them, a 
“smaller list of questionable songs was originally generated by the 
corporate office, but an overzealous regional executive began 
contributing suggestions and circulating the list via e-mail, where it 
continued to grow.”12  That regional program director apparently was 
Jack Evans, Clear’s senior regional vice president of programming in 
California.  According to Taylor, he “jotted down a few dozen titles that 
could be considered insensitive,”13 producing a list “he thought might 
have some songs on it that might cause heightened sensitivity given the 
tragic events last week.”14  (Slate reporter Eliza Truitt accused Clear of 
attempting to deny the existence of the list, although it seems that Clear 
did not deny the existence of a list so much as deny that it itemized 
“banned” songs.15) 
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Individual programmers sometimes ignored the list and sometimes 
added to it.  In Florida, local program director and DJ Mason Dixon 
pulled all songs from the 1960s and ’70s that deal with anti-war  
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sentiment:  for example, the Temptation’s “War.”  As Dixon put it, 
“Under the circumstances here, it’s not really appropriate talking about 
‘war, what is it good for.’  It’s making a statement that I don’t think 
reflects America’s taste right now.”16  The circulation of the list, it could 
be argued, confirmed to programmers around the nation that it was 
legitimate and perhaps that they were expected to trim from their own 
playlists songs that might be construed as “inappropriate.” 
 
17 
 
Editorial reaction to the Clear Channel effort was unfavorable.  While a 
Los Angeles Times editorial took a swipe at the record industry for 
marketing songs with “violent and misogynistic” lyrics, it also ridiculed 
the choice of songs on the list.  “The goal, as always,” said the editorial, “is 
not to censor individual songs but to think about songs as they are 
written and recorded.”17  Music critic George Varga labeled the move 
“pathetic.”18  In the Baltimore Sun’s Arts section, Chris Kaltenbach wrote 
that “the list is a scattershot approach to political correctness and 
patriotism that alternatively is thoughtful and silly, earnest, and 
laughable.  It’s also, in a very real sense, dangerous.”19  Ed Masley, 
Pittsburgh Post pop critic, labeled the list as the “worst sort of knee-jerk 
hysteria.”20  In The London Times, Giles Coren called the list 
“astonishing” and concluded that “Freedom of expression is always one of 
the early casualties of war.  And censorship should never be taken lightly.  
Clear Channel would do well to remember that the Taliban prohibited 
music and singing altogether.”21 
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A defense of Clear’s actions could be found on the Snopes “Urban 
Legends Reference Pages,” an online site that offers – as the name 
implies – to dispel various “urban legends” on matters ranging from 
American history to the Disney Corporation.  According to Snopes, “It’s 
not unusual in a time of sadness and mourning such as the one following 
the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. that radio and television 
stations temporarily suspend the airing of material – programs, songs, 
advertisements – that might be considered insensitive or in bad taste. . . .  
So many radio stations have recently invoked voluntary moratoriums on 
songs which refer to airplanes, crashes, violence, and death in their lyrics 
and titles.”22  Snopes contended that, “Other than some rather 
questionable choices of songs, the only thing remarkable about this list is 
that so many sensation-hungry news outlets have attempted to spin it as 
an outrageous mandate by Clear Channel to ‘ban’ certain songs from the 
airwaves.”23  While Snopes admitted that listing “Ticket to Ride” and 
“Ruby Tuesday” might “be a bit extreme,” it claimed that “there’s no 
telling what an audience might find upsetting in the current climate.”24  
The last statement is probably true, which is precisely the problem. 
 
 19  In the end, it seems that Clear did not impose a ban on certain songs, it  
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only “suggested” one; and the suggestions may or may not have been 
generated at the front desk of the corporate office, although the list seems 
to have had the support of the company’s executives.  The somewhat 
ambiguous character of Clear’s actions make an attack against  
“censorship” more difficult.  It is precisely why they deserve close 
scrutiny.  In past conflicts, such as World War I or  the Cold War, the 
primary locus of expression’s suppression was by public authorities.  In 
the current context, information flows are organized, but never entirely 
controlled, by huge transnational corporations.  Now the suppression of 
ideas, images, and cultures can more easily and, in some sense, 
accurately, be cast as a matter of private “choice.”  Radio-station owners 
and operators make these “choices” without a governmental mandate, so 
that legal questions of  “censorship” are largely avoided.  The time of 
trouble might have been relatively brief, since the list was disowned 
relatively quickly.  Yet there is no way to ascertain whether playlists have 
returned now to normal or whether they ever will.  Moreover it is exactly 
when hysteria is at its highest and public opinion at its most uniform that 
alternative voices are most needed:  because at such points of crisis, our 
political futures are determined. 
 
20 
 
The Clear Channel list is politically  important for three reasons.  First, 
Clear Channel actions reveal how centralized judgments about what is 
“appropriate” popular expression during crisis, war, and more ordinary 
times are being made by private authorities.  These wield tremendous 
economic power, with considerable influence over the creation and 
dissemination of cultural capital.  Second, the station’s rationale points to 
a shift toward the therapeutic as justification for the control of popular 
expression.  Third, the list is part of a larger political context in which 
judgments are being made daily, by both private and public authorities, 
about appropriate expression in our post-9/11 world. 
 
 
 
 Consolidation  
 
21 
 
Exploration of the first issue, the problem of centralized control, must 
take into account shifts in the economic context of radio.  In particular, it 
needs to consider monopolization of the airwaves and the important role 
of the Clear Channel in that process. 
 
 
22 
 
Following the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, what 
James W. Brock has labeled an “epic wave” of consolidation occurred.  
Mergers in the radio business jumped by 40% as 2000 stations and $14.3 
billion changed hands.25  In the years that followed, 11,000 radio stations 
had changes in ownership.  Brock notes that “mergers and acquisitions 
have radically transformed a field dominated by a handful of giant 
operating national chains of hundreds – in some cases thousands – of 
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stations.”26  The number of stations grew by four percent, from 10,403 to 
10,795; but the number of owners fell from 4,865 to 3,832, a 20% 
decline.27  Within this manic period of business activity, the Clear 
Channel resulted from mergers of several large radio chains. 
 
23 
 
Based in San Antonio in 1996, L. Lowry Mays owned 36 radio stations 
with about $74 million in total revenues.  Mays had begun by selling 
stocks.  He reluctantly purchased his first radio station in 1972 from a 
San Antonio furniture dealer who wanted to sell this unprofitable 
business.  Two years later, Mays purchased a second, and he slowly added 
more.  He took the company public in 1984.28  Clear Channel now has $8 
billion in annual revenue, with 1,214 local radio stations under its 
corporate umbrella.  These operate in 190 cities nationwide.  Clear 
Channel and Westinghouse, a larger media giant, together account for 
52% of all radio listeners in the top-ten metro markets.29  Taken together, 
the top ten radio conglomerates control 2,000 radio stations across the 
country. 
 
 
24 
 
Clear’s corporate activities are not limited to radio.  The company owns 
the largest American live-concert promotion company, 19 television 
stations, and 770,000 billboards.30  Clear also has entered into small-
venue concert promotions, purchasing the booking rights for some 1,000-
seat nightclubs.31 
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The consolidation of ownership has driven consolidation of delivery 
systems.  A smaller number of sources deliver goods to local 
marketplaces, while at the same time generating the illusion that they are 
local stations.  Thanks to digital advances, DJs can now broadcast “local” 
  programming from a few centralized locations.  Since music is now 
heavily formatted, the DJ’s sole responsibility is to provide a voice for the 
four or five breaks that occur each broadcasting hour, for some two 
minutes in total.  DJs “customize” an hour or two of chatter, and load it 
into a computer program.  It automatically interjects their material at 
appropriate places.  DJs glean tidbits of  “local knowledge” for their 
comments from faxes and e-mails sent by staff members who work “on 
the ground” in far-flung communities.  Audiences might believe that DJs 
are broadcasting from across town, when in fact they might be located 
several states away. 
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As a technical matter, up to 80% of Clear Channel stations could be 
included in this form of digital network.32  As with consolidation of other 
forms of global capital, one of the primary efficiencies involves labor 
costs.  By centralizing delivery, Clear was able to reduce the number of 
DJs working for the station.  (Those left tend to be highly skilled,  because 
they need to balance the demands of organizing the chatter of several 
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radio stations at once.  Keeping six or seven radio stations in play at one 
time can be challenging.33)  Recently Clear Channel again set precedents 
by sharing local-news anchors along with DJs.  Even listener contests, a 
long-time staple of local radio programs, are being consolidated.  
Listeners at a station may be offered a chance to win a $1000 prize for 
being, say, the tenth caller – unaware that they are competing against 
listeners in 33 other cities.  As with interstate lotteries, prizes have skied 
in value to include vacations and cars.  Yet the chances of winning have 
shrunk, since (unlike lotteries) the contests usually have only one winner 
per prize.  The locations of winning contestants are often not made 
public, although Clear claims that announcements are broadcast, as a 
matter of policy, “four times a day.”34  Still, in 2000, Clear Channel was 
fined $80,000 by the Florida Attorney General’s office for disguising a 
national contest as local by “interviewing” the winner with the spliced-
over voice of a local DJ.35 
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Increased size and control of market share can lead to arrogance and 
abuse of power.  A number of accusations by generally credible sources 
claim that Clear Channel has engaged in anti-competitive practices.  In 
January, southern California Congressman Howard Berman suggested 
that the Justice Department investigate Clear Channel for violating the 
Telecommunications Act by using corporate fronts to exceed allowable-
ownership limits.  One strategy is to take control of the programming and 
advertising of small independent stations, while keeping ownership 
nominally independent.  Clear has such agreements with 75 stations 
across the country.36  Clear Channel also has been accused of demanding 
payments in exchange for air time.37  It did not play Britney Spears, 
accusers say, because she did not hire the company to organize one of her 
tours.38 
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Dorothy Pomerantz, writing in Forbes Magazine, has suggested that the 
consolidation of the radio business creates more variety on the airwaves.  
The argument is that small independent stations become “homogenized,” 
because they are all attempting to capture a largest slice of local 
advertising dollars, whereas a large firm that owns several  stations in a 
given area tends to diversify to avoid competing with itself.  As evidence, 
Pomerantz cites Syracuse, New York, where Clear offers 10 formats on 12 
stations.  Defenders of consolidation also argue that there are so many 
venues available for listening that, even if radio becomes overly 
“homogenized,” it will not destroy “diversity.”39  Internet stations, CDs, 
and other options protect individual choice. 
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Format differentiation is not, however, a good indicator of playlist 
diversity.  Various formats overlap; and within formats, the artists that 
get airplay are generally those with major-label support and distribution.   
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That virtually every band or artist on the Clear Channel list is solidly in 
the musical mainstream indicates the kind of “diversity” promoted by 
corporate giants, both within and between various formats.  (Somehow 
“Bill Gates Must Die” by John Vanderslice did not make it onto the Clear 
Channel list.) 
 
30 
 
It is also becoming harder to locate distribution outlets beyond 
mainstream media.  MP3 sources Napster and Audio Galaxy have been 
shut down.  While Kazaa,. Morpheus, and other file trading programs 
remain, the recording industry seems more determined than ever to 
bring file-sharers under control.40  Low-wattage radio stations are illegal, 
and their managers are vigorously prosecuted.  Internet radio stations are 
now subject to royalty fees that will put many small operators out of 
business.41  Musical diversity that has  flourished at the margins is, in 
other words, being slowly but systematically eliminated from the cultural 
marketplace. 
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Sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, artists shape their 
musical sounds to make them radio friendly.  “As a record producer,” 
says T. Bone Burnett (of the Grammy-winning soundtrack for O Brother, 
Where Art Thou?), “I see [centralized control and market testing] all the 
time, because people come in and say, ‘This record, we’re going to try 
something different.  We’re going to push the boundaries.  We’re going to 
get out of the box.’  And as they go through the process they start out very 
brave, trying things.  And by the end of the record, it sounds just like 
every other record because at that point all the conventional wisdom has 
come in.  You know, ‘Well, the radio won’t play that.  We won’t be able to, 
you know . . .’”42 
 
 
32 
 
Regional radio stations – even regional musics – are mostly in decline.  
The local traditions and practices of Nashville, Tupelo, or the south-side 
of Chicago have been eliminated from most commercial  radio 
programming.  Local musical traditions are continually under siege from 
the homogenizing influences of radio, as young people who seek musical 
success follow the formulas rather than dig into the traditions of the 
places where they live.  Such places provided the energy and originality 
for what became American popular music.  Artistic success now often 
hinges on “crossover potential,” which encourages attempts to fudge 
what may at one time have been relatively distinct categories.  Twenty 
years ago, Shania Twain would have been unrecognizable as a “country” 
artist.  Today she is difficult to distinguish in musical style from 
“rock/rap” artist Kid Rock.  Clear’s tendency, when it moves into a new 
market, is to shift toward “soft rock” – the least offensive, most 
“mainstream” of rock formats.  Playing the songs of Billy Joel and Bruce 
Springsteen also serve the interests of concert promotion, since such acts 
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draw particularly well.43 
 
33 
 
Partly as a result of homogenizing trends, listeners are losing interest.  
Radio listening has declined noticeably.  From 1998 to 2002, the average 
fell from 21 to 19 hours a week.  Cat Collins, program director at KQKS, 
puts in concisely:  “Radio sucks.  It’s not what it used to be anymore.”44  
Listener decline has eroded the profits of corporate giants like Clear.  In 
the fourth quarter of 2001, company sales fell 8%; and net company 
earnings for the entire year fell 45%.  These figures shocked investors, 
and the stock dropped 10% after the news became public.45  President 
Mark Mays’s response was to suggest that the company would continue 
to expand, by acquiring more radio stations, and might acquire television 
stations as well.46  In May 2002, Clear Channel reported a first-quarter 
loss of $16.9 billion as the cost of complying with an accounting change 
that required the valuation of acquired assets.  But the loss was less than 
expected, so the value of the company’s stock increased from $45.12 to 
$46.66 a share:  good news, considering that the company’s stock had 
fallen 15% the previous year. 
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Given the size of the company and an owner whose main interests seem 
to have been financial rather than cultural, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
executives and program directors would take a ham-handed approach to 
programming after the September attacks.  We might expect the owners 
and managers of such large institutions to have little sense of the 
meaning or value of the cultural material that they distribute, except in 
the most narrow and market-oriented terms.  The Clear Channel list 
sustained no coherent connection between the meanings of the songs and 
the rationale for their suppression.  The ludicrous character of the effort 
indicates the cultural and semiotic ineptitude of those who control a large 
sector of  popular-cultural capital.  The Clear Channel list is worrisome 
because it involved a kind of censorship but also because it revealed how 
the economic forces that exert huge influence over productions of 
popular culture have little sense of their richness of meaning. 
 
 
 
 “Sensitivities”  
 
35 
 
The Clear Channel criterion of “sensitivity” is problematic.  Clear’s list did 
not censor in a traditional way.  It was not designed primarily to prevent 
subversive ideas from entering public spaces, where they might spark 
disorder, but to protect listener “sensitivities.”  Mike O’Connor, Clear’s 
FM programming director for Colorado, was reported to say that the 
“company was erring on the side of sensitivity.”47  Or as pop critic Neil 
Strauss put it, “Instead of promoting national safety, its intended aim is 
to ensure the national mental health.”48  Historically the idea of 
suppressing expression to protect “sensitivities” of impressionable people 
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has been disputed in the United States.  The American rationale for 
allowing expression to be suppressed identified levels of danger.  The 
“clear and present danger” test, at first interpreted generously by Oliver 
Wendell Holmes to include handing out leaflets in front of a naval 
shipyard, at least implies that speech suppression needs a political 
rationale.49  When the Supreme Court moved in the 1960s toward the 
somewhat more demanding test of whether speech would “incite to 
imminent lawless action,”50 the focus remained the potential of speech 
for fostering subversion or generating public disorder.  While the 
judgments on how much to protect speech rights may have varied, the 
emphasis in these cases is protecting the social order from perceived 
threats to its stability.  Whether people’s “sensitivities” might be offended 
does not factor overtly into the legal calculus. 
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Matters of “sensitivity“ entered into free-speech debates through 
“offensive speech.”  The conflict between a local radio station and the 
FCC over broadcasting George Carlin’s “seven words” comes closer to 
issues raised by the Clear Channel list.  The Supreme Court ruled that the 
FCC was justified in its rules and that “offensive” broadcast material 
could be grounds for restricting broadcasts in certain timeslots, when 
young listeners are most likely to tune in.  But in FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation, the Supreme Court primarily addressed matters of 
“indecency.”  The Clear Channel notion of sensitivity is more amorphous.  
In fact, the Clear Channel list seemed to collapse political and emotional 
concerns in ways with scant precedent.  If a test of whether popular-
cultural material may be withheld from public spaces hinges on the 
capacity to offend sensibilities, little could escape institutional control.  
Many more opportunities for such regulation could become available if 
the “war on terrorism” continues indefinitely. 
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Attempts to manage popular music became part of a broader attempt to 
manage dissent.  Others were perhaps more insidious.  On Politically 
Incorrect for September 17, Bill Maher said that, unlike the WTC 
attackers, “we have been cowards, lobbing cruise missiles from 2,000 
miles away.”  In response, Presidential Press Secretary Ari Fleischer 
warned, “The reminder is to all Americans that they need to watch what 
they say, watch what they do, and that this is not a time for remarks like 
this.  It never was.”51  The show was immediately, albeit temporarily, 
removed from the programming schedule.  Despite Maher’s profuse 
apologies, his contract was terminated in June of the following year. 
 
 
38 
 
University of Texas journalism professor Robert Jensen, in a column in 
the Houston Chronicle, labeled the 9/11 attack “reprehensible and 
indefensible,” but went on to suggest that the “act was no more 
despicable than the massive acts of terrorism – the deliberate killing of 
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civilians for political purposes – that the government has committed 
during my lifetime.”  For this, he was rebuked by University President 
Larry Faulkner, who wrote a letter to the newspaper stating that “Jensen 
is not only misguided, but has become a fountain of undiluted foolishness 
on issues of public policy.”52 
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Limiting or shutting down public discourse has been an important 
feature of post-9/11 political life.  The rationale is to protect us from 
future disruptions.  One reason we are “vulnerable,” repeat pundits and 
politicians, is that we are an “open society.”  If “openness” is 
vulnerability, controlling unruly aspects of the culture can seem 
reasonable to help insure our safety.  This has been true in past conflicts 
as well.  What is different now is the pervasiveness of popular cultures 
regarded as unruly and often “inappropriate” by the sources responsible 
for their distribution.  These sources are private and thus not subject to 
the same kinds of legal challenges as public censorship.  This is a 
troubling development, especially when their concentration and 
centralization might rival those of public authorities in oppressive 
regimes. 
 
 
 
 The Irony Debate in the Context of 9/11  
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Irony has a long and varied history that can, in the West, be traced at 
least to classical Greece.53  In the narrowest and simplest terms, irony is a 
literary device where the literal and intended meaning of a statement 
diverge.  As Wayne Booth puts it, “every reader learns that some 
statements cannot be understood without rejecting what they seem to 
say.”54  In literature, Booth suggests, “stable irony” provides a “literary 
fixity,” in which a reader “knows” with a high degree of certainty that the 
writer does not intend the words written to be taken “straight.”  Errors in 
interpretation can occur, of course, and a reader can be tricked by irony – 
perhaps later to recognize it with some degree of embarrassment.  Still it 
would be difficult, to take one of Booth’s examples, to read Jonathan 
Swift’s Modest Proposal, as anything other than ironic.55 
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Irony is not limited to fairly narrow, albeit interesting and important, 
matters of literary interpretation.  The presence and significance of irony 
in a culture has often been a subject for investigation and commentary.  
Since irony can reveal social absurdities and hypocrisies, as in Swift’s 
hands, it can be a wicked tool for social critique.  As such, it is sometimes 
resisted by cultural conservatives.  Irony is correctly perceived as a 
potential enemy of virtue, because it questions virtue’s seriousness.  
Kierkegaard understood this and famously attacked irony which “looks 
down, as it were, on plain and ordinary discourse immediately 
understood by everyone; it travels in an exclusive incognito. . . .  it occurs 
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chiefly in the higher circles as a prerogative belonging to the same 
category as the bon ton requiring one to smile at innocence and regard 
virtue as a kind of prudishness.”56 
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The relevance of irony to recent political debates quickened with the 
publication of Jedediah Purdy’s For Common Things:  Irony, Trust, and 
Commitment in America Today.57  Purdy’s book has received 
considerable attention in the few years following its publication.  The 
stated subject is irony in general, but the target is a kind of irony extant in 
popular culture.  Purdy follows a long line of popular cultural critics, 
from Matthew Arnold (whose poetry Purdy quotes) to Theodore Adorno.  
According to Purdy, they have seen in popular cultural representations 
nothing more than glitzy superficiality, entirely lacking in real cultural or 
political substance.  “Surfaces,” as Purdy distills their suggestions, may be 
“all we have to work with.”58 
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A key indicator of cultural decline for Purdy has been the television 
program Seinfeld.  Purdy seems genuinely horrified that the 
announcement of the show’s retirement made the front page of The New 
York Times.  He describes its end as “curiously insignificant, not because 
Seinfeld didn’t matter, but because the program so perfectly echoed the 
tone of the culture that its new half-hour each week had triumphed by 
achieving redundancy.  Like William Butler Yeats in W. H. Auden’s elegy, 
Seinfeld became his admirers.  There is some of him in all of us.”59  
Seinfeld is for Purdy “irony incarnate.”  It epitomizes the emptiness of the 
surfaces offered by the popular culture. “The point of irony,” Purdy 
suggests, “is a quiet refusal to believe in the depth of relationships, the 
sincerity of motivation, or the truth of speech – especially earnest 
speech.  In place of the romantic idea that each of us harbors a true self 
struggling for expression, the ironist offers the suspicion that we are just 
quantum selves – all spin, all the way down.”60 
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Seinfeld is a primary target of Purdy’s ire, but he doesn’t stop there.  He 
also attacks Wayne’s World, where “programmers and screenwriters 
have turned their own archives into a satiric resource.”  He disapproves 
of Beavis and Butthead, whose “eponymous antiheroes spend their time 
watching MTV – and subtly mocking its melodramatic, oversexed 
videos.”  Purdy worries about the pervasiveness of popular culture and its 
corrosiveness, which he views as linked.  “Like the characters in Wayne’s 
World, we find ourselves using phrases that are caught up in webs we did 
not weave, from their history on The Brady Bunch to President Clinton’s 
recent use of them, to their role in the latest book of pop spirituality.  In 
our most important moments, we inhabit a cultural echo-chamber.”61  
Everything becomes a cliché.  “[T]oday’s youthful conversation is little 
more than an amalgam of pop-culture references, snatches of old song 
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lyrics, and bursts of laughter at what would otherwise seem the most 
solemn moments.”62  Predictably Purdy was disheartened by Madonna 
and South Park, but he does admire Oscar Wilde’s satires, because he 
was a “romantic who believed that he displayed his true identity by 
flouting convention.”  Since Wilde had a “true identity,” he did not 
deteriorated into what Purdy most abhors:  the “quantum self.”  Wilde’s 
“dissent” from conventions was “authentic,” Purdy suggests, whereas, 
today dissent is “on sale at specialty boutiques.”63  With the embrace of  
irony, we have created a culture “worthy of despair,” where 
“disappointment and a quiet, pervasive sadness have crept into our 
lives.”64 
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To escape the despair, suggests Purdy, we search for antidotes to irony, 
an “anti-Seinfeld” position.  Purdy finds this in ubiquitous references in 
the popular culture to angels.  Angels are a way of “defying the weariness 
of the ironic culture.”65  Cars that bear bumpers stickers stating “Magic 
Happens” and “Mean People Suck” help “form the anti-Seinfeld 
position.”66  They indicate that, while we are fragmented “quanta,” we are 
searching for a way out of the “ironist’s jaded independence.”  “We are,” 
Purdy says, “fragmentary, even masters of fragmentation, and we hunger 
for wholeness.”67 
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The Purdy book warranted a positive story on NPR and a full story in The 
New York Times Magazine, but reviews were not uniformly positive.  In 
Harper’s, Roger Hodge questioned why might “the second-and third-
hand musings of a 24-year-old command our attention.”68  Caleb Crain, 
writing for Salon.com, referred to Purdy as “24, photogenic, sonorous, 
and out of his depth.”69  Crain suggested that “Purdy, unfortunately, has 
not dislodged irony with faith.  He has dislodged it with sly disingenuous 
manipulative pseudo-sincerity.”70  When a young writer faces that kind of 
hostility, he has hit a nerve. 
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Purdy’s essay no doubt helped create a literary context for the attacks on 
irony that followed 9/11.  Two essays contended approvingly that 9/11 
meant the “death of irony.”  The first was published in Vanity Fair by its 
editor Graydon Carter, who (ironically) had been an editor for the 
satirical Spy Magazine.  To make categorical statements in the midst of a 
horrific crisis seems a great temptation, presumably because responses 
are intense.  Such statements are revealing, since it is often difficult to 
shield honesty in periods of trauma.  At the same time, such declarations 
probably are mistakes, for the simple reason that judgment can be 
clouded by an overwhelming sense of the realities of that particular 
moment.  Carter pronounced that “There’s going to be a seismic change.  
I think it’s the end of the age of irony.  Things that are considered fringe 
and frivolous are going to disappear.”  At the time, the lack of any 
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important qualification made the statement seem powerful, perhaps 
profound. 
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Carter was then joined by Time columnist Roger Rosenblatt, apparently 
another person not inclined to be cautious in pronouncement.  He wrote 
that “One good thing could come from this horror:  it could spell the end 
of the age of irony.”  Rosenblatt could hardly contain his glee.  “For some 
30 years – roughly as long as the Twin Towers were upright – the folks in 
charge of America’s intellectual life have insisted that nothing should be 
believed in or taken seriously.  Nothing was real.  With a giggle and a 
smirk, the chattering classes – our columnists and pop culture makers – 
declared that detachment and personal whimsy were the necessary tools 
for an oh-so-cool life.”  Rosenblatt suggested that the age of irony had 
ended because the Trade Center bombings were “real.”  They could not be 
denied.  They were an antidote to our “age of irony,” in which “even the 
most serious things were not to be taken seriously.”  Somewhat 
inexplicably, he then attacked movies where the characters “see dead 
people” – presumably The Sixth Sense,71 a wonderful and haunting film 
directed by M. Night Shyamalan.  He also assailed “TV hosts who talk to 
the ‘other side’ suggesting that death was not to be seen as real.”72  It is 
difficult to know what to make of Rosenblatt’s examples.  They seem to 
criticize a position where the possibility of a hereafter signals an 
incapacity to distinguish between the “realities” of life and death.  That 
might be true in some respects, but it calls into question the “seriousness” 
of many of the world’s religious traditions. 
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Others jumped on the anti-irony bandwagon.  Taylor Branch, biographer 
of Martin Luther King Jr., suggested that the terrorism of 9/11 would be a 
“turning point against a generation of cynicism for all of us.”  Since the 
attacks on irony are often implicitly or explicitly aimed at “Gen Xers,” it 
was interesting, but perhaps unsurprising, that Camille Dodero cast the 
end of irony in generational terms.  Perhaps, she wrote for The Boston 
Phoenix, an alternative newspaper, “we’ve just witnessed the end of 
unbridled irony.  Maybe a coddled generation that bathed itself in 
sarcasm will get serious.” 
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Announcements of the death of irony, were not dispassionate statements 
of fact.  Never were they coupled with expressions of regret.  They 
revealed a censor’s desire to castigate.  They attempted a rhetorical 
discipline for ironic discourses.  They expressed the wish to control them, 
if not eliminate them, and to minimize their potential to disrupt more 
settled and stable ways of knowing and being.  Before 9/11, some 
elements of the intelligentsia viewed irony as a threat, and the events of 
9/11 offered opportunities to announce its exorcism from the body 
politic.  The argument is not that these people knew or approved of the 
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Clear Channel list; it is that they acted from the same apprehensions of 
popular culture’s powerful allure, often springing from its capacities to 
instigate irony and play.  Finally, they felt, these disorderly impulses 
could be, would be, restrained. 
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Those who excoriate irony seem to reject it for being antithetical to a 
virtuous national community that would presumably be restored in 
response to the attacks of 9/11.  The anti-ironists are hostile to irony also 
because it implies elitism and exclusivity.  Irony is damaging, so it seems, 
because it sets some apart in feeling superior to those others of (us?) 
dupes, who really believe in something and who engage in the hard daily 
work of building livable communities.  Richard Rorty recognizes this 
dynamic of irony as the danger of humiliation.  To read people ironically 
who intend to be taken seriously is to undermine them, to subvert their 
sense of self-respect.  As he puts it, “Ironism, as I have defined it, results 
from awareness of the power of redescription.  But most people do not 
want to be redescribed.  They want to be taken on their own terms – 
taken seriously just as they are, just as they talk.  The ironist tells them 
that the language they speak is up for grabs by her and her kind.  There is 
something potentially very cruel about that claim.  For the best way to 
cause people long-lasting pain is to humiliate them by making the things 
that seemed most important to them look futile, obsolete, and 
powerless.”73   Rorty considers himself a “liberal ironist.”  He is among 
those who are, “because of their realization that anything can be made to 
look good or bad by being redescribed . . . never quite able to take 
themselves seriously.”  They are “always aware that the terms in which 
they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the 
contingency and frailty of their final vocabularies, and thus of their 
selves.”74  If the danger of irony lies in its capacity to humiliate, the 
advantage of irony lies in its capacity to engender and express modesty. 
 
 
52 
 
While irony can exclude, the other side is its capacity to create zones of 
inclusion or community.  As Booth notes, “Often the predominant 
emotion when reading stable ironies is that of joining, of finding and 
communing with kindred spirits.”  These are the communities of those 
who “get it.”  Not “getting the joke” can be an unpleasant experience, but 
the pleasures of conspiracy generated by irony are not anchored in or 
dependent on the humiliation of people on the outside.  In fact, everyone 
is in principle a potential member of  the community of people who 
know.  An author or speaker, Booth observes, “assumes my capacity for 
dealing with it, and – most important – because he grants me a kind of 
wisdom; he assumes that he does not have to spell out the shared and 
secret truths on which my reconstruction is to be built.”75  This sharing of 
secrets, publicly stated, is one of the chief enjoyments of irony.  Thus 
Rorty is wrong to assert that “Irony seems an inherently private matter.”  
 
Thomas Shevory 25 Poroi, 2, 1, August, 2003 
He overemphasizes irony’s potentially negative consequences.  “Irony,” 
he asserts, “is, if not intrinsically resentful, at least reactive.  Ironists have 
to have something to have doubts about, something from which to be 
alienated.”76  Again this might be true in some respects, yet doubt and 
alienation are not conditions confined to  ironists:  they are endemic to 
current life.  The gift of irony is to allow playful encounters with our 
doubts, and to encourage others to join us in them. 
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Sweeping claims to cultural shifts, so that “nothing would be the same,” 
turned out to be overstated.  Writing in Salon.com, David Beers took on 
the anti-ironists, suggesting that, “Just when we need an ironic sensibility 
to remain clear-eyed in dangerous times, we’re told irony is obsolete.  
And this from some people who’ve made it their business to peddle a 
cheapened grade of irony over the past couple of decades until we’ve 
almost forgotten the true meaning of the word.”77  The anti-ironists, 
Beers explained, had misunderstood the true meaning of irony.  It had 
been reduced to “the nihilistic shrug of an irritatingly shallow smartass. . . 
.  Somehow, irony has come to be a handy shorthand for moral relativism 
and self-absorption, for consuming all that is puerile while considering 
oneself too hip to be implicated in the supply and demand economics of 
schlock.”78  Against this interpretation of irony, Beers proposed the 
“ironic engagement” of early twentieth-century essayist Randolph 
Bourne, who suggested that “The ironist is ironical, not because he does 
not care, but because he cares too much.” 
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While the supposed death of irony became an opportunity for 
sermonizing about the decline of moral culture in the mainstream press, 
a more interesting take on irony’s dangers was developed by San 
Francisco Chronicle arts critic Kevin Weston in examining the 
relationship between the “war on terrorism” and hip-hop culture.  
Weston was disturbed that the culture of gangsta rap had prepared a 
generation of young black men to support a national call to arms.  Irony 
was being used, he argued, to reinforce the support.  A Bay-area radio 
station that specialized in rap and R&B carried Osama jokes and insults 
three or four times an hour:  “‘Osama’s mama is so short, you can see her 
feet in her driver’s license picture.”  “Osama’s mama is so fat, if she cut 
herself, she would bleed fudge.”  According to Weston, this Clear Channel 
station carried none of the songs of the 1960s which were associated with 
civil rights struggles or the anti-war movement, such as Marvin Gaye’s 
“What’s Going On.”  Rap artists, such as Dr. Dre and P. Diddy, were 
producing Osama disses that supported the war effort.  Tupac Shakur’s 
songs about urban gang violence were being used “to steel his young fans 
on the idea of being a soldier for America.”79  Weston didn’t declare irony 
dead; rather he found it alive and well, operating as an instrument of 
social control, a means to demonize an already feared and hated enemy.  
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And why not?  Wasn’t Al Qaeda violence similar to the gang activity that 
had touch many young black men in various ways? 
 
 
 Irony’s Resurrection  
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Somehow irony did not “die” with the destruction of the WTC towers.  
Not long after the attack, various indications appeared that irony would 
return in a variety of guises.  The Onion put out an issue within a month, 
and it was heralded as missing none of the bite in previous issues.  In one 
story, the editors presented an interview with “God,” who said that the 
divine proscriptions against murder were clearly and simply stated.  
Another story suggested that the hijackers “were surprised to find 
themselves in hell,” noting that they had “expected eternal paradise for 
this.”  One headline read, “U.S. Vows to Defeat Whoever We’re at War 
with.”  Even Jedediah Purdy was quoted in The New York Times to say 
that some forms of irony can “work to keep dangerous excesses and self-
righteousness and extreme conviction at bay.”  Even Graydon Carter 
eventually revised his claim, stating that, “If I was talking about irony, I 
was talking about a specific form of television irony.  Irony well done in 
print is a beautiful thing that will be around.  This sort of smirky, 
detached sort of self-referential irony will go away. . . .  Events like this 
have historically changed the culture and this is probably no 
exception.”80  Even the revised statement, however, turned out to be 
wrong. 
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The first appearance of “terrorist” as a form of slang may have been on an 
NPR Morning Edition segment in which high school student Reyna 
Gillead read from her essay about it.  “Lately I’ve noticed a lot of young 
people using the word ‘terrorist’ as a form of slang.  At my school, one girl 
talking to her friend screamed out, ‘You’d better show up for the party, 
you terrorist.’  I was shocked.  I’d never heard the word ‘terrorist’ used 
that way.  My friends never even used to talk about terrorism, but when a 
teen-ager calls someone a terrorist or even ‘Osama,’ it’s usually a joking 
title for a friend, not an enemy.  In a way, my friends are taking the 
seriousness out of the word by making it part of everyday slang.  It’s fun 
to invent new words, and it’s even better when you know the words shock 
adults.”  She concluded by saying, “Calling your friends ‘terrorists’ may 
sound bad, but maybe, in a strange way, it’s helping us.  Just like adults, 
teen-agers just want everything to go back to normal. . . .  If nothing else, 
it just feels good to be obnoxious again.”81 
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Toward the end of March, a flurry of stories appeared on such teenage 
slang then disappeared.  On March 19, The Washington Post carried a 
front page article which said that, in teenage slang, messy bedrooms were 
“ground zero,” an ill-tempered teacher was “such a terrorist,” and 
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insignificant problems were “so September 10th.”  Unstylish clothing 
instigated the question, “Is that a burqua?”  “Weird” kids were “taliban,” 
or they had “anthrax.”  A Palestinian student was quoted to say that his 
friends jokingly referred to him as a “terrorist” or “fundamentalist.”  (He 
was neither.)  In the article, Alan Lippman, director of the Center at 
Georgetown for the Study of Violence, argued that the slang was an 
attempt to deal with underlying anxieties of youths who felt that they 
might be hurt by terrorism.  Muslim students would refer to one another 
as Osama as a way to “take back the power” of such negative words.  
“What better ways than humor to take those horrible ideas and make 
them go away?” Lippman asked.  Did reporter Emily Wax discuss the 
matter with Mr. Lippman then find apt students at high schools in the 
D.C. suburban area?  This seems most likely.  Or did student interviews 
lead her to Mr. Lippman’s office.  The article is unclear.  In either case, 
students in Fairfax, Virginia suggested that the multi-cultural character 
of the school facilitated the acceptance of such slang.82  Boston College 
English Professor Paul Lewis labeled this “terror slang” and organized a 
panel on it for an academic conference on humor studies. 
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The Scottish Daily Record dubbed this a “slang craze,”83 and Glasgow’s 
Herald compared the slang generated by September 11 to the lexicon of 
new words that sprang up in reaction to earlier conflicts:  “trenchcoat” 
from the First World War, “blitz” from the Second, “brainwash” from the 
Korean War, and “draft-dodger” from the Vietnam War.84  The 
Independent in London held that teenagers were “walking a fine line 
between humour and tastelessness.”  Then it added three other 
expressions to the list, none as clever as those in the Post:  “weapons-
grade salsa,” “shuicide bomber” (referring shoe-bomber Richard Reed), 
and “Osamaniac . . . meaning a woman who might find Mr. Bin Laden 
sexually attractive.”85  The findings of the Post article were picked up by a 
slew of international newspapers, and they were carried across the mass 
media in the U.S. as well.  CBS News did a story on the new lexicon, as 
did CNN. 
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Only The Toronto Star cast some doubt on the authenticity of this 
supposedly wide-spread phenomenon.  The paper compared the terror-
slang rage to the “Lexicon of Grunge,” reported in The New York Times 
during the heyday of grunge rock.  The Times attributed clever phrases 
such as “wack slacks” (old jeans), “bloated, big bag of bloatation” (drunk), 
“swinging on the flippety flop” (hanging out), and “lamestain” (not cool) 
to teenagers in Seattle.  Unfortunately for the Times, the story was based 
entirely on the word of an intern at Sub Pop Records, and it turned out 
that he had simply invented the phrases on the spot as a put-on.  Never 
questioning their authenticity, the Times reporter completely swallowed 
the hoax.  The Star wondered whether some of the interviewed students 
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might not be putting on the Post reporters as well.  Were teenager girls 
really referring to attractive young boys as “firefighter cute?”86 
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Whatever the case, the re-emergence of multiple versions of irony in 
post-9/11 discourses of popular culture has been politically significant.  
As with the Clear Channel attempt to suppress popular songs, 
pronouncements that irony is dead reveal how political and cultural 
authorities view expressions of popular culture as dangerous.  Thus 
irony’s resilience is a ground for hope.  It shows vitality in popular 
cultures that refuse submission to internal politics or external forces 
(“terrorists”).  Whether this means that popular cultures can offer 
meaningful challenges to dominant systems of power is an open 
question.  It warrants a closer look at  theories of popular culture. 
 
 
 
 Popular Cultural Politics  
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These investigations of responses to 9/11 address the subversive potential 
of popular cultures.  Do aspects of popular cultures allow for resistance 
against authority and social control?  Or, as products embedded in 
transnational capitalism, are popular cultures more likely to support that 
system, especially by diverting consumers from the social and economic 
inequities that surround them?  In what ways do popular cultures turn 
the accoutrements of consumerism against the intended manipulations of 
advertisers and corporate executives, and how do popular cultures 
amount to sophisticated and playful forms of acquiescence?  The issues 
are complicated in the wake of 9/11, because the ironic playfulness of 
popular cultures has a double impact.  It can wink at the unimaginably 
horrific, slighting prospects of catastrophic death.  Yet it also can 
challenges the sources of “terror.”  The Taliban, whatever else might be 
said about them, showed little sense of irony.  That regime did all within 
its power to eliminate access to global popular cultures. 
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In their postmodern forms, spawned by mass media in the twentieth 
century, popular cultures have been construed as a political threat by 
critics on both the right and the left.  The publicly stated wish that 9/11 
would extinguish the ironic playfulness so often endemic to popular 
cultures is merely a recent expression of an impulse with much historical 
precedent. 
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Matthew Arnold was the first and perhaps the greatest conservative critic 
of popular cultures.  According to him, “culture” is “a study of perfection . 
. . perfection which consists in becoming something rather than in having 
something.”  It involves the development of character, nobility.  At the 
same time, culture is the material:  the books, the music, the visual arts 
available to help people along that path.  Culture has therapeutic and 
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political value, since it is “to minister to the diseased spirit of our times.”  
At its best, culture provides grounding or perspective.  It aids the spirit 
“not so much by lending a hand to our friends and countrymen in their 
actual operations for the removal of definite evils, but rather in getting 
our countrymen to seek culture.”87  The “disease” of the times, according 
to Arnold, is anarchy.  This constitutes the condition of the working 
classes, the “raw and uncultivated masses” – the “vast, miserable 
unmanageable masses of sunken people.”88  Arnold saw the working 
classes as unconstrained and actively agitating against social controls. 
Only the authority of the state can reassert control, and culture’s role is to 
assist that project. 
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Arnold was unapologetic about his class orientation.  The “cultured” 
classes are the aristocracy and some enlightened segments of  the 
ascending middle classes.  These would defend the national interest from 
the potentially disruptive working classes through a system of education 
that would “civilize” them.  Popular cultures would be eliminated through 
this system of class hierarchy, with the working classes socialized into 
docility and obedience.  Their culture would be the national culture as 
defined by their social betters. 
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An explicit class orientation such as Arnold’s is virtually absent now from 
conservative culture critics in the U.S., but that does not prevent echoes 
of Arnold in their fears of popular cultures.   The absence of class analysis 
is partly the result of the long-standing illusion of U.S. society as mostly 
classless, composed almost entirely of a large middle class.  Also 
important is the legacy of the 1960s.  Some of the most privileged in the 
middle classes, adopted culturally (if not always politically) radical 
stances.  This was evident in their devotion to psychedelic drugs, sexual 
promiscuity, and rock music.  In the U.S., the right often defines cultural 
enemies as what  Newt Gingrich named the “McGoverniks” – privileged 
classes who supported “amnesty, acid, and abortion.”  Still the fears of 
cultural disorder voiced by William Bennett, Patrick Buchanan, and 
Robert Bork echo the earlier concerns of Arnold.  Bennett, former “drug 
czar” and ubiquitous television presence, has edited a Book of Virtues 
firmly in Arnold’s mold.89  Buchanan famously (and disastrously) 
declared at the 1992 Republican Convention that the U.S. is engaged in 
an internal “cultural war.”  Bork’s Slouching Towards Gomorrah details 
the decline and fall of American culture – largely from popular music, 
feminism, and pornography.90 
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Critiques of “mass” or popular culture are not confined to the political 
right.  The left has long had a complex relationship to popular cultures.91  
Some of the most systematic and unapologetic criticism of popular 
culture has come from the Frankfurt School, particularly Theodore 
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Adorno.  The left sometimes finds within popular cultures tendencies 
opposite to those feared by the right.  As John Storey notes, “Whereas 
Arnold . . . had worried that popular culture represented a threat to 
cultural and social authority, the Frankfurt School argued that it actually 
produces the opposite effect; it maintains social authority.”92 
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Adorno and his colleague Max Horkheimer associated popular cultures 
with industrialism and commercialism.  Popular cultures are produced by 
an “industry” that reinforces itself.  Comedies in which good-natured 
members of the working classes find humor in their circumstances were 
painted by Horkheimer and Adorno as attempts at cultural domination.  
Workers are being transformed into unthinking conformists, pliant to 
consumer temptations and capitalist ideologies.  Popular cultures deprive 
workers of the imagination  necessary to conceive alternative societies, 
and divert enthusiasm from actions that might lead to achieving changes. 
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Adorno’s distaste for popular culture appears with particular clarity in his 
essay “On Popular Music” in contrast to “serious music.”  According to 
Adorno, “A clear judgement concerning the relation of serious music to 
popular music can be arrived at only by strict attention to the 
fundamental characteristics of popular music standardization.  The whole 
structure of popular music is standardized, even where the attempt is 
made to circumvent standardization.”93  The standardization of popular 
music deprives the whole of any important relation to its various parts.  
Improvisatory “mistakes” in jazz, Adorno’s “dirty notes,” would be 
incorporated by listeners into normalized wholes, becoming politically 
irrelevant.  The aim is to create a “standard reaction” and “pseudo-
individualization” to reinforce capitalist ideology.94  This prepares young 
people as the “radio generation” for fascist collectivism.  “They are most 
susceptible to a process of masochistic adjustment to authoritarian 
collectivism.”95  Not so with “serious” music, where every aspect of a 
piece is essential for grasping the whole and where the entire context is 
necessary to make sense of each particular.  In “serious” music, wrote 
Adorno, “Every detail derives its musical sense from the concrete totality 
of the piece which, in turn, consists of the life relationship of the details 
and never of a mere enforcement of a musical scheme.”96  “Serious 
music” of the twentieth century, such as Stravinsky’s, resists the “cult of 
the machine.”  It renounces “dreaming” and adjusts to “raw reality,” so 
that listeners can “reap new pleasure from their acceptance of the 
unpleasant.”97  New Leftists later joined Adorno in disdain for popular 
arts.98 
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Cultural conservatives on the left and the right diverge on some effects of 
popular culture, yet they concur that it degrades.  It incites instinct, 
desire, submission, and violence.  Political conservatives contend that  
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popular cultures weaken codes of moral responsibility to unleash a 
dangerous unruliness.  In the view of some leftists, popular cultures 
undermine the potential for recognizing the inequities of capitalism and 
exercising the capacities for overcoming it.  Critics from the right and the 
left treat popular cultures in terms of frivolous, commercialized junk.  
They refuse even to entertain the idea that popular cultures might widen 
the possibilities for fulfillment, happiness, and enlightenment. 
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The political right and the cultural right align closely in opposing popular 
cultures, but the left often splits on cultural issues.  Cultural populists of 
the left reject disdain for popular arts.  They regard ironical 
appropriations of popular cultures as potentially important forms of 
cultural resistance, subversion, and collective recognition to foster 
political action.  Irony enters here as an important concept, because it has 
been so central to the meaning of twentieth century popular culture and 
art.  Thus Marcel DuChamp placed on display in galleries the most 
ordinary, even profane products of commodity culture.  His urinal and 
bicycle wheel provoke a multitude of ironical implications for “art” and 
the aesthetic value of commodities.  Andy Warhol advanced this project 
another step by showing how art objects can be found not only among 
commodities but also their packaging and marketing.  By appropriating 
the commercial into art, Warhol both resisted and embraced the 
pervasiveness of commodity culture.  He removed the “in-itself” from 
artistic meaning and overcame the gap between “high” and “popular” 
arts.  These innovations in irony have endured.  As Iain Chambers has 
put it, “Pop Art remained a cool, ironic exercise in definition confusion 
that left in its wake a tension that could no longer be ignored.”99 
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Popular culture continues to draw on its ironic potential to maintain its 
allure.  The Elvis cult, reruns of “Happy Days,” Cher’s exhibitionism, the 
tikki kitsch of “Survivor,” all things Hulk Hogan:  each has a certain 
winsome appeal, but each relies on irony for that appeal to work.  To 
cultivate “serious” (high) cultural aspirations is often the kiss of death for 
figures in the popular culture.  Punk rock, perhaps the most ironic of all 
musical forms, initially at least, was inspired partly by disgust for pop 
musicians who took themselves too seriously.  Johnny Rotten was said to 
have been discovered by Malcolm McClaren sporting an “I Hate Pink 
Floyd” t-shirt. 
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Recently a school of leftist cultural populism has emerged to embrace the 
myriad ways to read productions of popular culture.  Even when these are 
the inventions of a vast array of multi-national conglomerates for 
communications, they can become in the hands of ordinary people 
vehicles for endless ironical reversals.  Chambers recognizes that popular 
cultures now are products of a system of industrial capitalism.  “The 
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visual collage, accompanying us from morning to night, is a product of 
the three giant forces of the contemporary world:  industrialization, 
capitalism, and urbanization.  And the power of the images that these 
processes have produced . . . is inescapable.”  He acknowledges that 
these  creations are “artificial” and that capitalism is manufacturing “false 
desires” and “controlling our tastes” to manipulate publics.100  Yet the 
meanings that emerge from this system are not determined entirely by 
the processes of production.  “Set against the gloomy predictions of a 
media-induced totalitarianism,” Chambers observes, “there is the daily, 
inventive evidence of local control, local meanings, and a continual 
construction of sense that passes beyond the instrument logic of the 
‘culture industry.’”101  Artifacts of the popular culture have meanings that 
cannot be contained by “mechanized” logic.  Once released into the 
cultural marketplace, the artifacts of commodity culture take on lives of 
their own.  “The programme, magazine or item of clothing is not simply 
an ideological statement to be accepted or denied; its possible meanings 
are not exhausted by ideology; it rarely offers a straightforward example 
of obvious incorporation or resistance.”102 
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John Fiske maintains that texts of popular culture should be evaluated by 
their capacities to inspire multiple and potentially subversive 
interpretations.  A text ambiguous or interesting enough to facilitate 
alternative readings is a better text than one that does not.  Fiske 
contrasts “writerly” texts to “producerly” ones.  Writerly texts define the 
domain of the avant garde in requiring highly disciplined activities of 
interpretation.  They are not judged by accessibility to audiences; often 
they are valued for the obverse, making themselves inaccessible, 
indecipherable, or shocking.  The avant garde earns applause for 
“making strange” the world.  Popular texts, on the other hand, are 
“producerly.”  A popular text “does not challenge the reader to make 
sense out of it, does not faze the reader with its sense of shocking 
difference both from other texts and from the everyday.  It does not 
impose laws of its own construction that readers have to decipher in 
order to read it in terms of its, rather than their, choosing.”  Accessibility 
does not eliminate possibilities for audience participation in re-creating 
the text, which “can theoretically be read in that easy way by those 
readers who are comfortably accommodated within the dominant 
ideology.”  Yet it is open enough to expose, “however reluctantly, the 
vulnerabilities, limitations, and weaknesses of its preferred meanings; it 
contains, while attempting to repress them, voices that contradict the 
ones it prefers; it has loose ends that escape its control, its meanings 
exceed its own power to discipline them, its gaps are wide enough for 
whole new texts to be produced in them – it is, in a very real sense, 
beyond its own control.”103 
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Fiske’s analysis of popular cultures is optimistic.  Few popular artifacts 
seem to strike him as failing standards for producerly texts with 
subversive potentialities.  He applauds Dallas, 90210, and Disneyworld.  
Marketplace products are, in his view, all potential tools for disrupting 
systems of cultural domination.  This populism provides a valuable 
alternative to the cultural snobbery of Arnold and Adorno, but it might be 
too generous.  By embracing popular cultures for their possible effects, it 
ignores, and perhaps denies, aesthetic distinctions.  Simon Firth has 
criticized populist views on precisely these grounds.104  Should such 
works only be valued for their capacities to generate oppositional 
readings?  If so, he asks, how do we know whether they are achieving this 
result?  A sociological analysis would seem in order to determine the 
impacts of popular-cultural works on audiences; but this is difficult to 
configure and conduct, and almost never undertaken.  Consumers of 
popular cultures seldom debate the capacities of their favorite television 
programs or rock albums to generate resistant interpretations.  Yet 
popular culture, to paraphrase Firth, is an “argument that anyone can 
join.”  The argument is less about capacities for resistance than qualities.  
Academic critics would do well to meet popular cultures on the same 
grounds that consumers do:  evaluating works of art more than modes of 
resistance. 
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Nonetheless Fiske is correct that the accessibility of popular culture is a 
great strength.  Despite attempts by producers and distributors to 
manage popular culture, it seldom slips fully under their control.  In fact, 
a popular culture entirely under the control of film producers or record 
executives probably would prove unmarketable.  Popular cultures need 
interventions from audiences to stay accessible, fashionable, hip.  The 
relationships of audiences and producers, to determine who wields what 
power, are matters of protracted struggle, negotiation, and invention. 
 
 
 
 Conclusion  
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The attacks of September 11 revealed both the political power and the 
political limits of popular culture.  The Clear Channel efforts to manage 
playlists recognized that productions of popular culture, especially 
popular musics, could disrupt attempts by authorities to build support for 
the political and military responses forthcoming.  At this point, even the 
slightest disruptions seemed dangerous.  Yet reaction against the Clear 
Channel policy demonstrated the power and vitality of popular culture, 
and an eventual recognition that its suppression would not be a simple 
undertaking.  Important to this vitality are liberal discourses for 
marketplaces of commodities and ideas as well as against censorship.  
That Clear Channel managers did not anticipate possible reactions 
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against their attempts at repression indicates that they misunderstood 
the meanings and values that various publics draw from the cultural 
materials over which the corporation exercises considerable control. 
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If the disruptive potential of popular culture resides largely in the 
imaginative capacities of consumers to find alternatives there, as Fiske 
suggests, the suppression of particular kinds of materials might not be 
telling.  Audiences can still make use of what is available to support 
possible doubts about conduct of the “war against terrorism” or other 
acts.  If the aesthetic and political contents of popular cultures matter 
immensely, as Firth contends, the centralized control of popular cultures 
implied in the wake of 9/11 could be crucial.  In either case, attempts by 
corporations and governments to suppress powerful expressions in 
popular cultures probably will continue, and they might even be relatively 
effective over time. 
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Pronouncements of the “death of irony” represent another kind of 
attempt to manage popular cultures.  Some critics greeted with delight 
the thought that 9/11 would undermine the unruliness of irony in our 
popular cultures.  Terrorist attacks were to wipe the collective smirk from 
the faces of a generation of Seinfeldian slackers.  But irony, as anybody 
should have known, did not disappear.  Its value in politics is important, 
if limited.  Irony has not and probably cannot bear the principal burden 
for responding to our situations. Yet it has provoked alternatives to the 
heavy-handed moralism of Bush and Ashcroft.  Ultimately irony may 
mark the limited political roles that popular cultures can play in political 
resistance and transformation.  They can provide cultural groundwork for 
challenging a system of domination, even if they cannot prove sufficient 
to overthrow it.  More adventurous forms of political activism may be 
necessary for that. 
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